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THE FIRST COMPLAINT: AN
APPROACH TO THE ADMISSION OF
CHILD-HEARSAY STATEMENTS
UNDER THE ALASKA RULES OF
EVIDENCE
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ABSTRACT
The age of child sexual abuse victims and the private nature of sex crimes
make it notoriously difficult for prosecutors to find sufficient admissible
corroborating evidence for an effective prosecution. The Alaska courts have
responded by stretching various codified and common-law hearsay rule
exceptions to accommodate child-hearsay statements. In this Note, the Author
discusses the inadequacies of this approach and proposes amending the Alaska
Rules of Evidence to include a consistent hearsay exception for child-hearsay
in sexual abuse cases, based on the first complaint rule and compliant with
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford
v. Washington and Davis v. Washington.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite concerted efforts over the last twenty years to reduce its
frequency, child sexual abuse continues to represent a grave threat to
Alaska’s children. In 2009, more than one hundred cases of child sexual
abuse were substantiated in Alaska.1 That statistic represents only a
fraction of all actual incidents of child abuse, diminished by the fact that
fear, and in many cases love, prevent more than ninety percent of
incidents from being reported to the police.2 Although child abuse is an
intensely private crime, its direct and indirect costs are openly borne by
the victim, his or her family, and society as a whole. Victims often
require substantial mental health assistance and are much more likely to
suffer from at least one psychological disorder.3 In the long term, sexual
abuse makes its victims more likely to abuse drugs or alcohol, spend
time in prison, and experience teen pregnancy.4

1. Statistics on Child Abuse: Family Service Child Reports of Harm by
Region, Federal Fiscal Year 2006, http://www.ridalaskaofchildabuse.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010).
2. See Irving Prager, Sexual Psychotherapy and Child Molestors: The Experiment
Fails, 6 J. JUV. L. 49, 72 (1982) (stating that “more than ninety percent of all child
molestations apparently go unreported”).
3. Childhelp, National Child Abuse Statistics, http://www.childhelp.org/
resources/learning-center/statistics (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); see also National
Center for PTSD, Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/
child-sexual-abuse.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
4. Id.
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Detecting sexual abuse and prosecuting its perpetrators is
notoriously difficult. For a variety of reasons, sexual abuse is both
underdisclosed and underreported.5 The difficulty of charging and
prosecuting an abuser is enhanced by the lack of witnesses beyond the
child, the lack of corroborating physical evidence, and the reluctance or
inability of the victim to testify against the perpetrator.6
The difficulties and costs of abuse must not cause us to forget the
rights of alleged abusers. Child sexual abuse is a heinous crime, but
alleged offenders must be provided the same Due Process rights as any
other defendant. In particular, the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees defendants the opportunity to confront
any witness against them through rigorous cross-examination.
In an effort to resolve the many difficulties of prosecuting child
abusers, prosecutors and courts have attempted to admit as evidence
out-of-court allegations of abuse made by victims to third parties. These
statements would normally be inadmissible hearsay under the Alaska
Rules of Evidence, but courts have admitted them under various
exceptions to the rules.7 Out of necessity and the widespread belief that
children are unlikely to lie about sexual abuse, courts have stretched
these exceptions to allow admission even when statements otherwise
fail to meet any exception’s general requirements. For example, courts
have admitted statements made long after an abusive event through the
“excited utterance” exception.8 This approach, uneven at best, is
inadequate to draw the necessary balance between admitting childhearsay statements and protecting defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights
after the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Crawford v.
Washington9 and Davis v. Washington.10
This Note explores the application of Alaska’s Rules of Evidence to
child-victims’ out-of-court statements and recommends a change that
5. See Prager, supra note 2, at 72.
6. David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1008 (1969).
7. Numerous exceptions have been applied in child sexual abuse cases
including: ALASKA R. EVID. 801(a) (Prior Inconsistent Statements); ALASKA R.
EVID. 801(b) (Prior Consistent Statements); ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(3) (Recorded
Statement by Child Victims of Crime); ALASKA R. EVID. 803(2) (Excited
Utterances); ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23) (Residual Exception).
8. Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Md. Ct. App. 1969) (admitting the
hearsay statement of a four-year-old rape victim although the statement was
made four to five hours after the assault, and the court found the child had been
calm at the hospital for several hours before making the statement).
9. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (defining a new approach to the confrontation clause
based upon whether statements are testimonial in nature).
10. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (clarifying the term “testimonial” by announcing an
objective “primary purpose” test to evaluate police interrogations).
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would enable courts to admit child-hearsay statements more freely
when they comply with the Confrontation Clause. Part I explains the
unique nature of child abuse prosecutions and why the hearsay
testimony they often rely upon is generally both reliable and necessary.
Part II discusses the reinvigorated Confrontation Clause and how
admitted statements must comply with defendants’ constitutional
rights. Part III describes the current approach of Alaska courts for
admitting child-hearsay in sexual abuse cases. Part IV suggests a
statutory amendment to the Alaska Rules of Evidence for evaluating
child-hearsay statements in a consistent fashion, based upon the first
complaint rule. This proposed exception would strike the important
balance of admitting statements even when a declarant is unavailable,
while still complying with the new requirements set forth in the
Crawford and Davis decisions. Given the special circumstances of child
abuse, this more certain hearsay exception for statements of child sexual
abuse victims would provide needed direction, consistency, and fairness
in prosecutions, and protect vulnerable child witnesses.

I. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
Questions about the admission of out-of-court statements are not
unique to cases involving children, but “there are perhaps no other cases
in which these questions arise so regularly and are imbued with such
urgent significance.”11 Additionally, detecting and prosecuting sex
offenders is notoriously difficult, “in large part because there often are
no witnesses except the victim.”12
A.

Difficulties Faced in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions

The difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases arises
partially because sexual abuse is such an intensely private crime. Often
no one except the accused and the victim are present when the abuse
takes place, and in many cases the abuser is a parent, relative, or trusted
acquaintance of the child.13 This private nature ensures that abuse is

11. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
12. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
13. GOVERNOR’S REPORT TO THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE: PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE, JULY 1, 2006—JUNE 30, 2007 at 22 (Jan. 2008), available at http://
www2.state.id.us/ag/sexual_prosecution_reports/2007IdahoProsecutionOfChil
dSexualAbuseReport.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S REPORT] (illustrating a study
that found that eighty-six percent of abusers were family members, friends, or
acquaintances of their victims).
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both underdisclosed and underreported.14 Child victims often
experience low self-esteem, guilt, isolation, depression, embarrassment,
and feelings of inadequacy.15 These feelings lead to a reticence to tell
anyone about the abuse, and a tendency for children to feel responsible
for and blame themselves for its occurrence.16 These and other traits of
victimization make children unwilling, and in some cases unable, to
answer the detailed questions relating to the abuse that police and
prosecutors necessarily require.17 In cases where a child is old enough to
understand the consequences of his or her decision to talk, the child may
be forced to choose between the abuse and losing a parent or step-parent
because of the abuse.18
Even when a child chooses to tell someone about the abuse, it is
often difficult for police and prosecutors to find admissible evidence to
corroborate the victim’s claims. Many sex crimes do not involve physical
penetration or contact that leaves physical marks such as bruises;
instead, abuse takes the form of petting, fondling, or exhibitionism.19
These less violent methods of abuse can be perpetrated without leaving
obvious physical evidence, and even when children are examined by
medical professionals, no certain conclusions can be drawn. This often
leaves prosecutors with precious little evidence outside of the children’s
statements to support accusations of child abuse.20
When sufficient evidence is found and an alleged abuser is
charged, the prosecution can be further hindered because children are
often unable to tell their stories at trial. Victims are often too young to be
competent witnesses or unable to cope with the trauma of being in a
courtroom and facing their accuser, so they are declared unavailable.21
Even when they are able to testify, child-victims are often
“unsophisticated,” “inarticulate,” and “emotionally torn by the
experience.”22 As witnesses, children are “impressionable, readily
confused, and incapable of furnishing any detailed verbal account of
[an] offense.”23 Beyond these weaknesses, children sometimes retract

14. See Prager, supra note 2, at 72.
15. Christopher Bagley, Development of an Adolescent Stress Scale For Use of
School Counselors, 13 SCH. PSYCHOL. INT’L 31, 49 (1992).
16. Barbara Brooks Johnson, Sexual Abuse Prevention: A Rural Interdisciplinary
Effort, 66 CHILD WELFARE 165, 165–67 (1987).
17. Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of
Sexual Assault, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 137 (1984).
18. Id.
19. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13.
20. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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true accusations of sexual abuse out of love, guilt, fear of reprisal, or fear
that the offender will be sent to jail.24
For jurors, child testimony about sexual abuse is often more
traumatizing than valuable and is sometimes met with skepticism and
disbelief.25 As the Alaska Court of Appeals stated in Nitz:
Jurors are left with virtually no frame of reference for
evaluating the credibility of the victim’s story, which is bound
to seem, at one and the same time, too serious to be accepted
uncritically and too shocking to be rejected lightly. Reliance on
personal experience and common sense will be of little value to
most jurors: because the victim is a child and sexual abuse of
children is a subject alien to the experience of most jurors a
realistic context for evaluating truthfulness will be difficult to
find.26
The private nature of sexual abuse, lack of corroborating evidence
for children’s claims, and difficulties with child testimony indicate the
need for hearsay statements in child sexual abuse prosecutions to be
approached in a unique manner. To effectively prosecute child sexual
abuse, prosecutors need more tools at their disposal.
B.

Using Victims’ Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions

The use of hearsay statements made by child victims can alleviate
many of the shortcomings described above. Section 801 of the Alaska
Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as “statement[s], other than [those]
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”27 Hearsay statements
are generally inadmissible under the Rules. The danger of this type of
testimony is that its value rests upon the credibility of an out-of-court
speaker whose memory, perception, narration, and sincerity cannot be
tested by cross-examination.28 The law is explicit that hearsay is
admitted only under codified exceptions contained in the Rules, or

24. Glen Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child’s Statement of Sexual Abuse,
18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 6 (1984).
25. See Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Fitzgerald
v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1299 (D.C. 1982).
26. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 60–61.
27. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(c).
28. 2 MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 245–246, at 583–84
(Edward Cleary et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter 2 MCCORMICK].
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through other exceptions “prescribed by the Alaska Supreme Court, or
by enactment of the Alaska Legislature.”29
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are generally allowed for two
reasons: reliability and necessity. Some out-of-court statements are made
with circumstantial guarantees of reliability that substitute for in-court
guarantees like an oath and cross-examination.30 For example, a
statement may be admitted as an excited utterance because it is made
when the declarant is under the influence of a startling event and is
therefore less likely to lie. Second, necessity sometimes justifies the use
of hearsay evidence.31 For example, statements are admitted when a
declarant is deceased or when the statements have unique evidentiary
value that cannot be obtained from other sources.32 Section 803 of the
Alaska Rules of Evidence contains a list of twenty-three codified
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay.33 Additionally, some
common-law exceptions to the rule against hearsay survived the
adoption of the Alaska Rules of Evidence and continue to be applied by
Alaska courts.34
Research shows that statements by victims of child sexual abuse are
appropriately admitted under these exceptions.35 First, children’s
statements are generally reliable.36 One study found that roughly ninetyfive percent of children’s accusations are accurate.37 Others show more
generally that although children cannot provide descriptions of events
in the same detail as adults, the information they do provide is just as
29. ALASKA R. EVID. 802.
30. 5 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 251
(James H. Chadbourn ed. 1974) [hereinafter 5 WIGMORE] (noting that some
hearsay is so reliable that cross-examination is a “work of supererogation”).
31. See FED R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“[W]hen the choice
is between evidence which is less than the best and no evidence at all, only clear
folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.”).
32. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 253.
33. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(1)–(23).
34. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 136 (Alaska 1986) (citing Greenway v.
State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980)) (noting that some common law evidence
rules survived the adoption of the Alaska Rules of Evidence).
35. Gary Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Witnesses in Sex Offense
Proceedings, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL
RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, A.B.A. 184 (Josephine
Bulkley ed., 1982).
36. Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of
Sexual Assault, J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 127 (1984) (“[T]here is little or no evidence
indicating that children’s reports are unreliable, and none at all to support the
fear that children often make false accusations of sexual assault or
misunderstand innocent behavior by adults.”).
37. Faye A. Silas, Would a Kid Lie: Probably Not, Studies Find, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1985, at 17 (noting a study that found that roughly ninety-five percent of
children’s accusations of sexual abuse were accurate).
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accurate.38 Studies also show that children can remember as much or
more than adults when they are familiar with the situation.39 In
particular, children can develop a knowledge base for repeated
experiences that become familiar to them.40 In situations of repeated
sexual abuse, these findings imply that children’s memories of the abuse
would likely improve as abuse is repeated and becomes more routine
and familiar to them.41
Second, research shows that children are unlikely to lie about being
sexually abused. Generally, children do not have the necessary
vocabulary or knowledge about sexual matters to lie about them.42
Many do not even realize that what has happened to them is wrong,43
and most are unlikely to promulgate a continuous lie to parents and
authority figures for a substantial amount of time. Furthermore, studies
show that children can separate fantasy from reality,44 and they are
unlikely to fabricate accusations of sexual acts they know little about.45
Finally, children’s out-of-court statements may be more accurate
than in-court testimony. Children’s memories can fade rapidly,
indicating that statements made closer to the time of the assault may be
more reliable than in-court testimony.46 Studies show that cognitive and
developmental limitations may restrain children’s ability to relate events
38. JON’A F. MEYER, INACCURACIES IN CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: MEMORY,
SUGGESTIBILITY, OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY? 15 (1997) (“The few items children
provide on free recall tend to be highly accurate.”).
39. Michelle Chi, Knowledge Structures and Memory Development, CHILDREN’S
THINKING: WHAT DEVELOPS? 73, 82 (Robert Siegler ed., 1978) (finding that young
chess players are able to recall chess positions briefly presented to them better
than adults unfamiliar with the game).
40. Stephen Lepore, Child Witness: Cognitive and Social Factors Related to
Memory and Testimony, 3 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 65, 83 (1990).
41. MEYER, supra note 38, at 13.
42. Janet Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, THE SEXUAL
VICTIMOTOLOGY OF YOUTH 175, 177 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980).
43. Thomas W. McCahill et al., THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 44 (1979) (“In many
cases, the nature of the event (or events) is merely confusing. Whereas the event
is disturbing to the victim, it is perhaps no more disturbing than so many other
aspects of a child’s life.”).
44. See, e.g., Patricia Morison and Howard Gardner, Dragons and Dinosaurs:
The Child’s Capacity to Differentiate Fantasy from Reality, 49 CHILD DEV. 642, 645
(1978) (reporting that elementary school students could differentiate between
real and fantastic images).
45. Marcia K. Johnson & Mary Ann Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy:
The Reliability of Children’s Memory, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 45 (1984); see also Kathleen
Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth?, 8 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 471, 475 (1984) (asserting that children will not make up stories because
it is not “in their interests” to do so and many children lack the requisite sexual
knowledge to convince an adult they have been victimized).
46. A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 204–05
(1979).
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under pressure.47 Requiring a child-victim to testify in a sexual abuse
case often creates stress that could adversely affect the child’s perception
and memory.48 The stress of testifying is intensified by the fact that most
child-victims know their abuser as a relative or friend and must face him
or her in the courtroom.49
The use of hearsay testimony is more appropriate in child sexual
abuse cases than in many other criminal cases. Children’s out-of-court
statements are generally reliable because children lack the knowledge
and vocabulary necessary to fabricate stories of sexual abuse and lack
the motive to lie about the incident in a free-recall situation;
furthermore, they are not subject to the stress and possible manipulation
of testifying against a loved one in court when making the out-of-court
statements. These statements can be a powerful tool to help alleviate
many of the problems prosecutors have in corroborating allegations of
child sexual abuse.

II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
CHILD-HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER ALASKA LAW
Abuse cases too often end up as a swearing contest between a child
victim and an abuser maintaining his innocence. When much of a case
hinges on the testimony and credibility of a child, it is unfair to allow too
much testimony “through a parade of articulate, experienced, adult
witnesses who impart to the child’s statements the mature eloquence of
adulthood and a sense of their own credibility, while adding nothing of
substance but the force of repetition.”50 This is particularly true when
victims are found unavailable to testify and the defendant is unable to
confront his accuser.
Courts must be careful in sexual abuse cases to protect defendants’
constitutional rights.51 The Sixth Amendment mandates, “In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.”52 The clause is applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment53 and is applicable when the state offers
47. Id.
48. Cf. id. at 208–09 (citing a study that showed children were adversely
affected by the pressure of making identifications from lineups, in contrast to
identifications made from slides).
49. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13, at 22.
50. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 61 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause was incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore binding on the states).
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otherwise admissible hearsay against a criminal defendant. A literal
reading of the Confrontation Clause would bar the admission of all
hearsay evidence, but the Supreme Court has not interpreted the clause
this way.54 However, the clause places significant limits on the use of
hearsay evidence by generally requiring the declarant to testify and be
cross-examined.55 The requirements of the Sixth Amendment reflect the
longstanding belief that face-to-face confrontation at trial enhances the
truth-finding process by allowing the jury the best opportunity to judge
the credibility of the witness under oath.56
A.

The Confrontation Clause’s Evolution from the Adequate Indicia
of Reliability Approach to the Testimonial Statement Approach

Recent decisions have dramatically altered the application of the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay statements. For nearly a quarter of a
century, courts viewed statements under the criteria set forth in Roberts
v. Ohio.57 Roberts held that, to be admissible under the Confrontation
Clause, hearsay statements had to be “necessary” and “reliable.”58
“Necessity” required that the prosecution “produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant.”59 “Reliability” required that the statement be admissible
only under a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule or where
evidence existed showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.60
Unless the evidence fit within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or

54. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (holding that the general
prohibition against hearsay evidence must “occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case”); see also
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
55. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406–07; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43.
56. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 1420 (“The theory of the hearsay rule . . . is
that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may
lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to
light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or
security may in a given instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in
that instance, that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would
be a work of supererogation.”).
57. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts and its progeny defined Confrontation Clause
rights from 1980 until the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66.
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id. at 65–66.
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the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine the witness,61 the
testimony had to be excluded.62
In Crawford v. Washington,63 the Court altered the paradigm for
Confrontation Clause analysis and ostensibly overruled Roberts.64 Justice
Scalia, speaking for the Court, held that the “firmly rooted hearsay
exception[s]” or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under
Roberts were not enough to protect defendants’ Confrontation Clause
rights.65 Instead, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause would bar
the admission of all “testimonial statements” unless the declarant was
available as a witness or the defendant had prior opportunity to crossexamine him.66 The Court defined “testimony” as “a solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact,” 67 and noted by example that “an accuser making a statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
a casual, offhand remark to an acquaintance cannot.”68 Some statements
qualify as testimonial under any definition of testimonial, such as ex
parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.69 However, the Court refused
to more thoroughly define “testimonial.”70
In the Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and
Hammon v. Indiana,71 Justice Scalia returned to the task of defining
“testimonial” and set out an “objective” test:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose is to

61. Id. at 66.
62. Id.
63. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
64. Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“In choosing the path it does, the
Court of course overrules Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), a case decided
nearly a quarter of a century ago.”); see also Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F.
Supp. 2d 852, 862 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that Crawford completely overturned
Roberts but that Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), was only partially
overturned).
65. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
66. Id. at 53–54.
67. Id. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 52.
70. Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
71. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

GOCHNOUR_FINAL.DOC

82

5/7/2010 5:33:08 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 27:1

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.72
In Davis, the Court distinguished two sets of statements according
to this “primary purpose” test. It found statements made by the victim
during a 911 call to be non-testimonial, even though they accused the
defendant and described an assault.73 The Court reasoned that the
statements were made during an ongoing emergency, and that the
operator’s questions were designed to enable police assistance and not
to investigate the crime.74 Another set of statements, made by a victim in
response to police questioning shortly after an assault, were found to be
testimonial because the purpose of the questioning was to investigate a
crime in preparation for filing charges.75
The Davis decision left important questions unanswered. The Court
declined to establish a bright line rule regarding what statements are
considered “testimonial” or “interrogatory” or explicitly state whose
purpose (i.e., the questioner or the responder) is most relevant in
determining whether a statement is testimonial.76 Importantly, Crawford
and Davis involved statements made to police officers, who are typically
not the recipients of the first complaint in child abuse cases. It is not yet
clear whether statements made to private parties can be considered
testimonial.77
B.

Application of the Confrontation Clause to Child Abuse Cases

The Supreme Court has given very few reference points for
examining the renewed Confrontation Clause’s effect on child hearsay
statements. In Crawford, the Court referred to White v. Illinois.78 In that

72. Id. at 822.
73. Id. at 827.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 828.
76. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 615 (2d ed. 2008).
77. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.2 (2006) (conceding that the
analysis did not reach the question of “whether and when statements made to
someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial’”); see also
Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation:
“A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L. J. 917, 920–43 (2007). Professor
Mosteller makes reference to White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805 (1990); and The King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. (1779) as reference
points in applying the Davis/Crawford paradigm to hearsay in child abuse cases.
78. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004) (“One case arguably
in tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination
when the proffered statement is testimonial is White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992), which involved, inter alia, statements of a child victim to an investigating
police officer admitted as spontaneous declarations.”).
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case, the trial court admitted hearsay statements made by a child sexual
abuse victim to a babysitter, mother, police officer, nurse, and doctor
under various hearsay exceptions.79 The Court affirmed admission of the
statements under the “excited utterance” and “statement to medical
professional” exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that those
exceptions were firmly rooted and that therefore the testimony was
independently reliable.80 Justice Scalia’s reference in Crawford indicates
that the victim’s statements to the police officer likely conflicted with the
Confrontation Clause.81 Interestingly, Scalia made no reference to the
testimony of the babysitter, mother, nurse, and doctor.82 This explicit
reference to the police officer’s statements, while not identifying the
statements made to the parent, babysitter, nurse and doctor as
testimonial, offers a guidepost in interpreting the clause in child sexabuse cases.83
Allowing the testimony of private parties in child sexual abuse
cases makes sense under the objective test set forth in Davis. When a
parent, babysitter or doctor asks a child what is bothering him or what
caused certain injuries, the primary purpose of the questioning is not to
“establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”84 Instead, the point of the questioning is almost always to
solve the problem; in other words, to enable “assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.”85 Because of the tremendous risks associated with
child sexual abuse and its nefarious and private nature, even if a child is
not in immediate danger when questioned, the situation might be
considered an emergency for Confrontation Clause purposes.
In applying Crawford and Davis, appellate courts have used the
White guidepost and the Davis criteria to determine if hearsay statements
are testimonial. Their analysis has included examining the identity of a
questioner and her relationship to the State, the purpose of the
questioning, the knowledge or belief of the child as to the future use of
the child’s statements, and the situation’s formality and relationship to
law enforcement.86 A victim’s statements to parents, family members,
79. 502 U.S. at 350–51.
80. Id. at 356.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Mosteller, supra note 77, at 942–44.
84. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
85. Id.
86. State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006) (holding statements made to the
victim’s mother and a family friend non-testimonial under these criteria), cert.
denied sub nom. Shafer v. Washington, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006); see also State v. Hosty,
944 So.2d 255, 261 (Fla. 2006) (holding statements made by a twenty-three-yearold mentally handicapped sexual abuse victim to a teacher were not testimonial
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and friends have generally been treated as non-testimonial.87 Statements
to medical professionals who first examine a child after an incident are
also generally treated as non-testimonial.88 Alternatively, statements to
police officers are routinely classified as testimonial regardless of the age
of the child or the formality of the circumstances involved.89
In State v. Pantano,90 the Nevada Supreme Court drew an explicit
contrast between statements made by children to their parents and
statements made to police:
A parent questioning his or her child regarding possible sexual
abuse is inquiring into the health, safety, and well-being of the
child. To characterize such parental questioning as the
gathering of evidence for the purposes of litigation would
unnecessarily and undesirably militate against a parent’s
ability to support and nurture a child at a time when the child
most needs that support. We therefore conclude that [the
child’s] statements to her father were nontestimonial in
nature.91

but that statements made to a police officer were testimonial); In the Interest of
N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Mo. 2007) (holding that statements to a childvictim’s mother were admissible under Crawford).
87. State v. Coder, 968 A.2d 1175, 1186 (N.J. 2009) (holding a child-victim’s
statements to her mother admissible as non-testimonial statements under the
Crawford analysis); see also State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 23–24 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005) (holding statements to a foster parent were non-testimonial); People v.
Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21 (Colo. 2006) (holding statements to the victim’s father
and the father’s friend were non-testimonial).
88. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Where
statements are made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of
diagnosis or treatment, they are presumptively nontestimonial.”); see also People
v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218–20 (Cal. 2007) (holding statements made to a doctor in
an emergency room were non-testimonial); Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 685
(Miss. 2005) (holding statements made as part of neutral medical evaluations did
not meet Crawford’s “testimonial” criterion).
89. See, e.g., Cage, 155 P.3d at 210, 217–18 (holding statements made to police
officers during an informal emergency room meeting were non-testimonial);
State v. Grace, 111 P.2d 28, 31, 38 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statements by a
child victim to a police officer were non-testimonial).
90. 138 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2006). In Pantano, the child testified and was available
for cross-examination; the court recognized that the Confrontation Clause was
not violated regardless of whether the statement was testimonial, but addressed
the issue because it wanted to clarify treatment of this class of statements. Id. at
482.
91. Id. at 483.
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Alaska’s Application of Crawford and Davis

The Alaska Court of Appeals has not directly addressed how the
Confrontation Clause should be applied in sexual abuse cases; however,
its decisions offer some guidance in addressing hearsay testimony after
Crawford and Davis. First, the court has followed the distinction the
Supreme Court drew in Crawford between statements made to
government officials investigating a crime and statements made to
friends or acquaintances.92 Since victims’ out-of-court statements are
most often made to family members, medical personnel, or social
workers, and not to police officers, this distinction carries special import.
Second, the court has used an “entirety of the circumstances”
analysis to apply the Davis “primary purpose” test. In Clark v. State,93 the
court held that hearsay statements identifying the assailant in a physical
abuse case did not violate the Confrontation Clause.94 The victim,
Amouak, was allegedly beaten by her boyfriend, Clark.95 When she
arrived at the hospital for treatment, Amouak told emergency room
personnel that Clark had assaulted her.96 During trial, the State relied on
medical records describing Amouak’s statements identifying Clark.97
The court found that based on the entirety of the circumstances—
”the underlying events of the evening in question, plus the subsequent
actions and statements of Amouak, the nurse, and the doctor”—it was
objectively clear that the victim and medical personnel acted with the
primary purpose of obtaining or providing medical care.98 This analysis
corresponds with that of other courts, which have found statements
made by children to parents, medical personnel, and social workers
admissible under the primary purpose test.99
Finally, even first complaints made to a police officer might be
admissible when the statements were made to stop an ongoing
emergency. In Anderson v. State,100 the court of appeals evaluated
statements made by an assault victim to the police.101 When the officers
arrived after the assault had ended, they were led to the victim, who
was lying on the floor in the fetal position and had suffered life-

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Potterfield v. State, 145 P.3d 613, 614 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1213.
See supra notes 88–89.
163 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 1001.
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threatening injuries.102 When the officer asked the victim to describe
“what happened,” the victim identified the assailant as Anderson, the
man police had apprehended in the apartment’s other room.103 The court
found the officer’s question was focused on determining the nature and
extent of the injuries and the assistance that would be needed.104
Furthermore, the officer initially knew only that someone had been hurt
and not that a crime had been committed.105 Under these circumstances,
the court held that the officer’s question and the victim’s statement had
the primary purpose of ending the ongoing emergency and were
therefore non-testimonial.106
Under this analysis, in certain circumstances a child’s statement to
a police officer about ongoing abuse may be admitted without offending
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Because of the secretive nature
of sexual abuse and general absence of physical harm, only rarely will
this be the case. However, in cases where a child is raped or sexually
assaulted, this analysis shows that statements admissible under a
hearsay exception may not violate the Confrontation Clause, even if
made to police officers.

III. ADMITTING CHILD HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER THE
ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE
The reliability and necessity of hearsay evidence in sexual abuse
trials has caused it to be admitted under a variety of codified and
common-law exceptions in Alaska. A discussion of the currently used
exceptions illustrates, however, the weaknesses of this ad-hoc approach
and the necessity of a more systematic regime for admitting childhearsay statements. Such a regime could protect the rights of both
children and defendants. This discussion is not meant to encompass all
methods used to introduce hearsay testimony in sexual abuse cases, but
rather to illustrate that the court’s and legislature’s current approach to
child hearsay is inadequate, and to suggest a new hearsay exception that
would recognize the unique reliability of child hearsay statements.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
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Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception

One important way in which hearsay statements are admitted
when a child abuse victim is unavailable as a witness is the “excited
utterance” exception codified in the Alaska Rules of Evidence as Rule
803(2).107 The rule is supported by the basic theory that certain
circumstances “may produce a condition of excitement which
temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free
of fabrication.”108 Because such statements are inherently reliable, the
availability of the declarant is immaterial. A declaration may be
admitted as an excited utterance only when it is “sufficiently
contemporaneous with the event” that it can be regarded as having been
stimulated by the event and not by the declarant’s deliberation.109
Declarations made after the shocking circumstances have faded are not
admissible as excited utterances.110
Alaska’s application of the excited utterance exception in child
abuse cases has generally followed these principles. The Alaska
Supreme Court announced the test for determining if a statement is an
excited utterance in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey:111 “Was the declaration
spontaneous, excited, or impulsive, or was it the product of reflection
and deliberation?”112 Application of the test has focused on whether
there was opportunity for “reflection”113 or “reflective thought”114 before
a statement was made. Courts have used the amount of time between an
exciting event and a statement to determine whether there was
opportunity for reflection. In Torres v. State,115 the Alaska Supreme Court
admitted evidence of a child victim’s complaint to her mother as an
excited utterance.116 Approximately five to ten minutes had elapsed
between the assault and the young girl’s statement to her mother.117 The

107. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(2) (“A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.” (emphasis added)).
108. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note.
109. 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 288, at 226 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 14th
ed. 1986).
110. Vandiver v. State, 726 P.2d 195, 198 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (“We recently
recognized that, in order to qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must be
made while under the stress of the event, and must not be the product of
reflective thought.”).
111. 558 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1976).
112. Id. at 884.
113. Lipscomb v. State, 700 P.2d 1298, 1307 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
114. State v. Agoney, 608 P.2d 762, 764 (Alaska 1980).
115. 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974).
116. Id. at 793.
117. Id. at 792.
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court looked to the short period of elapsed time and evidence that the
girl was “excited and emotionally upset” in reasoning that there had
been little opportunity for deliberation or fabrication.118 In contrast, the
Alaska Court of Appeals in Sluka v. State119 concluded that a child’s outof-court statements made nearly four hours after a physical assault did
not qualify as excited utterances.120 The court reasoned that the length of
time between the attacks and the statements, and the dearth of evidence
that the child had been “emotionally engulfed by the situation,”
necessitated a denial of the exception.121
The focus on spontaneity and the time between an assault and a
statement fails to account for the unique circumstances surrounding
child sexual abuse. According to the excited utterance rule, a child’s
hearsay report must take place soon after an assault. This is inadequate
in sexual abuse cases for several reasons.122 First, many children do not
regard sexual abuse as shocking or even unusual.123 Often, children act
normally because they do not know what child molestation is or
understand why an abuser committed the act. Some children even view
sexual incidents as expressions of warmth and affection.124 Dr. Alfred
Kinsey described children’s view of sexuality this way:
[C]hildren have only a dim sense of adult sexuality. What may
seem like a horrible violation of social taboos from an adult
perspective need not be so to a child. A sexual experience with
an adult may be something unusual, vaguely unpleasant, even
traumatic at the moment, but not a horror story. Most
children’s sexual experiences involve encounters with fondlers
and exhibitionists, . . . and it is difficult to understand why a
child, except for its cultural conditioning, should be disturbed

118. Id. at 793.
119. 717 P.2d 394 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
120. Id. at 398.
121. Id. The court also referenced the fact that the child’s statements had come
as a response to questioning, a very common situation in child abuse cases. Id.
While the court did not hold the amount of time that had elapsed, emotional
state, or fact that the statement was a response to a question as dispositive, the
totality of the circumstances indicated that the statements were not reliable
enough to be excited utterances. Id.
122. See Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Hearsay Statements in
Child Sex Abuse Cases, 1983 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1755 (1983) (discussing
inadequacies of excited utterance exceptions for child-hearsay statements).
123. McCahill, supra note 43, at 44.
124. Kee MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN
88–89 (Jane Chapman Roberts ed., 1978).
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at having its genitals touched, or disturbed at seeing the
genitals of other persons.125
Second, children may make complaints long after a sexual act;
hours, days, months,126 or even years127 may elapse before a child
reports abuse. A delay can be caused by numerous factors, including
feelings of confusion or guilt, fears of not being believed, efforts to
forget, or threats made by the defendant to the victim.128 In many cases,
a child will remain silent until circumstances compel him to recount the
experience.129
Because of these stark realities, courts in many jurisdictions have
stretched the excited utterance exception beyond its traditional limits in
order to admit hearsay testimony of child sexual abuse victims.130 These
courts made decisions to avoid the harsh results of a strict hearsay
exception that could destroy the prosecution’s entire case. Such a broad
application of the exception destroys its integrity and leaves precedent
that is inconsistent and difficult to follow.
B.

The Residual Exception

Alaska’s courts have sometimes used the residual or “catch-all”
hearsay exception131 in sexual abuse cases to admit child hearsay

125. ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 121 (1953).
126. See Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980) (finding that a child
victim did not report a rape for over one month after its commission).
127. See Emery v. State, No. A-7799, No. 4608, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 198
(Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2002). The victim, who had been abused for several
years by her stepfather, did not go to authorities for more than two years after
the last act of abuse. Id. at *5. The court allowed an expert witness to explain
why a child often does not report child abuse immediately, especially against a
family member. Id.
128. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061.
129. See, e.g., State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d 413, 416 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982).
130. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969)
(allowing the hearsay statement of a four-year-old rape victim although the
statement was made four to five hours after the assault and the child had been
calm at the hospital for several hours before the statement), State v. Noble, 342
So.2d 170, 172–73 (La. 1977) (admitting as excited utterances statements of a
four-year-old victim made two days after the rape), Haley v. State, 247 S.W.2d
400, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) (admitting as excited utterances statements of a
child victim more than eight hours after a rape).
131. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23); ALASKA R. EVID. 804(b)(5). These exceptions
allow hearsay statements not covered by any other hearsay exception provided
that the statement has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and
provided that “(a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c)

GOCHNOUR_FINAL.DOC

90

5/7/2010 5:33:08 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 27:1

statements that cannot qualify under any other hearsay exception. In
particular, this exception has been used when a declarant is unavailable
but his statement cannot fit into the excited utterance exception. In
Broderick v. Kings Way Assembly of God Church,132 the Alaska Supreme
Court defined the residual exception’s requirements and emphasized its
proper use.133 A young child told her mother that a church nursery
worker had committed sexual abuse.134 At trial, the only identification of
the alleged abuser came from testimony by the girl’s mother.135 The
court’s analysis focused on whether the circumstances surrounding the
child’s statement provided indicia of reliability equivalent to those of
other hearsay exceptions.136 It held that the child’s testimony was
inherently reliable based on her young age, childish terminology,
consistency, and lack of motive to lie.137 These factors correspond to
those used by courts in other jurisdictions to allow child abuse
statements to be admitted under the residual hearsay exception.138
Some commentators have advocated using the Broderick court’s
application of the residual hearsay exception on a more generalized
basis, in essence creating a hearsay exception for child abuse statements
based on the criteria of the residual exception.139 The Broderick court,
however, explicitly stated that while “the residual exception may
sometimes be appropriate in the child abuse context,” it “does not create
a new class exception to the hearsay rule.”140
Although basing the introduction of children’s reports of sexual
abuse on the residual hearsay exception might offer courts more
flexibility, such an approach is inadequate for two reasons. First, as the
court noted in Broderick, it would expand the rule beyond its limited
intent.141 The exception was not intended to allow an entire class of
hearsay statements to be admitted pursuant to its requirements.142

the general purposes of these rules and interest of justices will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.” ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23).
132. 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991).
133. Id. at 1218. The court noted the widespread use of the residual exception
in other states and circuits. Id. at 1218 n.17.
134. Id. at 1214.
135. Id. at 1217.
136. Id. at 1219–20.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Bertrang v. State, 184 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1971).
139. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND
PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING
LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 35 (1982).
140. Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1218.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Instead, the rule was intended to be used rarely and only in special
circumstances.143
Second, some statements allowed under the residual exception
would likely fail to meet the exacting standards of the Court’s
reinvigorated Confrontation Clause. Statements by child victims to
police and other agents of the state might meet the criteria of the
residual exception, but would be classified as testimonial and prohibited
by the Sixth Amendment.
C.

Medical Records Exception

Hospital records, including statements made by patients about how
their injuries occurred, are admissible under Section 803(4) of the Alaska
Rules of Evidence. Although these statements are generally made in
response to questions, the statements are viewed as highly reliable
because patients believe that the quality of their medical care is
contingent upon the accuracy of the information they give to their
doctors.144 The exception admits statements made to all medical
personnel—not only doctors—so long as the statement is related to
diagnosis and treatment.145 The medical records exception is particularly
useful in child sexual abuse cases because it does not require that the
victim be available to testify.
Alaska courts’ application of the medical records exception
generally mirrors application of the federal exception. Evidence is
admissible as long as it relates to the cause of the victim’s condition.146 A
statement that assigns fault or identifies the assailant, however, is
inadmissible.147 In Johnson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court explained
the distinction: “Since statements fixing fault and indicating the identity
of an assailant are not relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment, they
lack assurances of reliability and should be excluded.”148
In the recent case of Clark v. State,149 the Alaska Court of Appeals
applied the exception in evaluating the admissibility of an assault
victim’s statements to her doctor regarding her injuries.150 The court
143. Id.
144. 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER
TREATISE SERIES 246–47 (1992).
145. Id. at 248.
146. Johnson v. State, 579 P.2d 20, 22 (Alaska 1978) (holding statements that
identified the victim’s attacker are inadmissible under the medical records
exception).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
150. Id. at 1205.
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held as admissible evidence that the injuries were inflicted by another
person, the manner they were inflicted, and the amount of force used by
the perpetrator.151 The identity of the perpetrator, however, was
inadmissible under Johnson.152
The medical records exception will continue to be a valuable tool in
prosecuting sex offenders; however, its use is still limited because the
identity of the perpetrator is generally inadmissible under the exception.
In some cases where a victim is unavailable to testify, his or her
statement to medical personnel may be the only evidence that the child
named the abuser. As with the excited utterance and residual hearsay
exceptions, in this situation, courts are faced with a difficult decision
between expanding an exception beyond its traditional form or allowing
valuable evidence identifying an alleged abuser to slip away.
D.

Recorded Statement by Child Victims of Crime

Section 801(d)(3) of the Alaska Rules of Evidence contains a special
exception for recorded statements made by child sexual abuse victims.
The exception allows recorded statements made prior to a trial to be
shown to the jury, provided the defendant is available as a witness to be
cross-examined.153 Exceptions like 801(d)(3) were enacted in many states
during the 1980s in an attempt to solve issues surrounding children’s
ability to testify in the courtroom.154 Prerecorded statements can also
preserve child testimony from memory loss or recantation.
Alaska’s statutory exception complied with the Confrontation
Clause as it was then enforced under Roberts, by requiring that the
victim be available for cross-examination. However, the exception still
inadequately balances the rights of the accused with the special nature
of child abuse testimony. Like the current application of the first
complaint doctrine, the recorded statement exception requires that a
victim be available for cross-examination. This means that a child’s
statements are most likely to be prohibited in cases where they are most
necessary.155

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(3).
154. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.071 (2007) (Texas videotaping
statute admitting the result of a child interview by a neutral investigator).
155. Where a victim is available to testify, corroborating hearsay might be
allowed under the first report exception, or if the victim’s story is impugned,
under the prior consistent statement theory. It is where victims are unavailable
due to absence, age, or trauma that a videotaped statement might be most
helpful.
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Furthermore, the statutory prerecorded statement exception is most
likely to be used when the victim is available on videotape in a
controlled and prepared setting, but unavailable in the courtroom
because of the trauma of live testimony.156 Under the current law, the
standard of availability for cross-examination is low, and courts are
lenient in allowing prosecutors to introduce videotaped testimony.157
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this lenient standard should allow the
admission of such psychologically powerful testimony.158 Under the
“primary purpose” test announced in Davis,159 videotaped testimony
would be testimonial because the purpose of the interview is to prepare
the statement for trial. It seems likely that the Confrontation Clause
requires that, when presenting the videotaped testimonial statements of
a young child under 801(d)(3), the child must be available for crossexamination about the statements and the circumstances of their
making; otherwise, they should be deemed inadmissible.
E.

The First Complaint Doctrine

The first complaint exception to the hearsay rule evolved from the
original “hue and cry” doctrine of the English common law.160 This
doctrine presupposed that a victim of violent crime would immediately
cry out and alert her neighbors that she had been assaulted.161 This
theoretically allowed neighbors and friends to search for the aggressor
and dispelled any notion that the victim was complicit in the crime.162
156. See Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1021 n.50 (Alaska 2006). The court
noted that at the defendant’s original trial the victim was “so terrified of
appearing as a witness that she hid under a table in the court building’s law
library and could not be convinced to come out, or even to communicate, despite
repeated entreaties by the prosecuting attorney.” Id.
157. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988). The Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not successful
cross-examination. Id. A witness has “appeared for cross-examination” for
Confrontation Clause purposes if he has taken the stand and willingly answered
questions, even if he has no recollection of the facts underlying the prior
statement and minimal recollection of making the prior statement. Id. at 559–60.
158. For a discussion of the complexity of the right to effective crossexamination, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling around the Confrontation Clause:
Redefined Reach but not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19–
20 (2006), available at http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/
vol105/griffin.pdf.
159. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also supra notes 144 to 148 and accompanying
text.
160. 4 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1134 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., 1972) [hereinafter 4 WIGMORE] (explaining the original purpose
of the “hue and cry” in English common law).
161. New Jersey v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 374 (N.J. 1990).
162. Id.
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The doctrine gradually fell out of favor for most violent crimes, as it
proved generally ineffective in leading to the aggressor’s apprehension,
and even one complicit in the crime could raise the cry.163 However, its
importance in rape and sexual assault prosecutions increased as the
primary purpose of the “hue and cry” evolved from a method of
facilitating an aggressor’s capture to a method of dispelling any
suspicion that a victim had fabricated assault charges.164 Under this
doctrine, evidence of a victim’s complaint was fully admissible as
substantive evidence and was an important part of the State’s case-inchief, rebutting the presumption that if no complaint was made, then no
violence had been committed.165
During the early 1800s, as evidence rules were developed and the
prohibition against hearsay gained importance, complaints still
admitted under the “hue and cry” tradition became suspect and courts
enforced a somewhat more stringent fresh complaint rule.166 The rule
admitted evidence that a victim had made a “fresh complaint”—a
complaint made shortly after the incident167—but excluded most of the
details of the complaint, including identification of the assailant, and
prevented the testimony from being used to show that an assault
actually occurred.168 The evidence of the complaint was admitted for the
sole purpose of forestalling the “natural assumption”169 that if a woman
had not complained to someone, then she had not been harmed.170
Courts have applied this principle to require that the victim of a crime
must testify, since the testimony’s sole purpose is to repel the
inconsistency between the victim’s current testimony and former
silence.171
The Alaska Supreme Court initially recognized the first complaint
exception to the hearsay rule in a footnote in Torres v. State.172 In

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1134.
166. Hill, 578 A.2d at 375.
167. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1135.
168. Hill, 578 A.2d at 375.
169. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1135.
170. Id. The evidence was admitted during the prosecution’s case in chief, and
in the process it preemptively negated evidence not yet introduced by the
opponent. Wigmore explained this apparent paradox: “[T]his process is regular
enough in reality, because the impression upon the tribunal would otherwise be
there as if the opponent had really offered evidence of the woman’s silence.” Id.
171. Id. § 1136.
172. 519 P.2d 788, 793 n.9 (Alaska 1974). In that case, an eight-year-old victim
had complained of a sexual assault to her mother five to ten minutes after the
occurrence. While the court admitted the statement as an excited utterance, it
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Greenway v. State, the court more clearly defined and applied the
exception.173 Harold Greenway was convicted of raping his thirteenyear-old stepdaughter in July 1978.174 According to the victim,
Greenway threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the rape.175
Three days after the assault, she allegedly mentioned the incident to her
mother, but the mother misinterpreted the conversation and took no
action.176 When school started in September, the victim reported the rape
to her high school counselor.177 The trial court allowed the testimony of
both the mother and the counselor.178
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
admit testimony from the mother and the counselor, applying the
exception it first acknowledged in Torres.179 The court noted:
In a prosecution for a sex crime, such as rape or assault with
intent to rape, it may be shown by testimony of the prosecutrix
or by that of some other witness, that the prosecutrix made
complaint of the crime shortly after its commission. Such
evidence tends obviously to indicate the truth of the charge and
is corroborative thereof; conversely, evidence of the failure to
make a prompt complaint casts doubt upon the truth of the
claim that a crime had been committed.180
The court failed to further explain its reasoning, leaving application
of the principle to lower courts’ understanding of the Wigmore and
Wharton evidence texts. The court did indicate in a footnote that the
exception would allow only the admission of the fact of a complaint, but
not the details of that complaint.181 It also admitted the statement despite
the one-month delay between the assault and the victim’s conversation
with her guidance counselor, finding that the delay was explained by
the victim’s age and Greenway’s threats.182 In doing so, the court held
that delay in reporting does not necessitate excluding a complaint, but

noted that the statement might also be admissible under the fresh complaint
doctrine. Id. at 790–97.
173. 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980).
174. Id. at 1060.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1060–61 (quoting 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 313 (Charles
E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 1972)).
181. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061 n.4.
182. Id. at 1061.
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rather is a factor that may be considered in weighing the complainant’s
testimony.183
The rule set out in Greenway continues the gradual evolution of the
fresh complaint doctrine. Although the fact that an assault had taken
place is admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief to corroborate
the victim’s testimony and repel any assumption that might be inferred
from a victim’s silence, under Greenway, the details of the assault and the
identification of the perpetrator are not admissible.184 The decision
relaxed the traditional freshness requirement, and indicated that a
statement’s timing was not dispositive, but rather only one factor in
determining a victim’s credibility.185
The Greenway court’s first complaint rule was altered by the court
of appeals’s decision in Nitz v. State.186 There, the court of appeals
considered the case of a stepfather accused of abusing his stepdaughter
from the time she was seven until she reached eleven.187 Under
Greenway, the trial court in Nitz admitted testimony by the child’s
mother that the victim had said that “daddy” had been bothering her;
testimony by an officer who interviewed the child the day after her
accusations; and testimony by another officer who had received a more
detailed version of the events from the victim more than four months
after the initial accusations.188 The court of appeals held that the
Greenway rationale applied only to the first complaint of sexual assault
and could therefore be invoked to admit the statements made to the
victim’s mother, but not those made to the police officers.189 The court
also noted a “marked trend” in other jurisdictions towards relaxation of
the first complaint rule’s prohibition against the admission of details.190
Therefore, the court held that details of the complaint, including the
identity of the assailant, were admissible “within the reasonable limits of
the trial court’s discretion . . . .”191

183. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1197 (Mass. 2005)
(citing Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061).
184. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1060–61. This interpretation comes from the
WHARTON text quoted in the Greenway and Torres opinions. See supra note 109.
185. Id.
186. 720 P.2d 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
187. Id. at 58.
188. Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 62.
190. Id. at 63. “In recent years, there has been a marked trend toward
relaxation of the traditional restrictions governing admission of evidence of the
victim’s first complaint.”See also Michael H. Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt
Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 489,
502–06 (1983).
191. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 63.
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The first complaint rule has served an important purpose in child
sexual abuse cases. Unfortunately, its utility is hampered by both its
limitation to testifying declarants and its somewhat inconsistent
application by Alaska courts. First, courts have applied the first
complaint exception only when a victim testifies.192 In child abuse cases,
this potentially disqualifies reliable statements made by victims who are
too young or otherwise unable to appear in court.193
Second, application of the Greenway rule has in some respects been
inconsistent. In Greenway, the court allowed two witnesses to testify
under the first complaint doctrine.194 Nitz, in contrast, noted that the rule
permitted only one witness to testify.195 Relaxing the details requirement
“for the purpose of enabling the jury to obtain a fair understanding of
the circumstances under which the complaint was made”196 has also
resulted in confusion. Some cases have allowed an abuser’s identity to
be revealed along with other details of a complaint; others have not. 197
The shortage of concrete applications on these issues further indicates
192. Ryan v. State, 899 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (The court
noted that “because the rationale of the ‘first complaint’ exception is to
corroborate the victim’s testimony, the State can rely on this exception only
when the victim testifies.” The court held that because the victim had not
testified at grand jury and could not testify at trial, her statements could not be
admitted under the “first complaint” hearsay exception.); see also 4 WIGMORE,
supra note 160, § 1136.
193. See, e.g., Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d
1211 (Alaska 1991). In Broderick, the Alaska Supreme Court held an unavailable
three-year-old victim’s statements reliable for purposes of the residual hearsay
exception. Id. at 1220. Factors indicating reliability included the age of the victim,
childish terminology, and lack of a motive to lie. Id. at 1218–20.
194. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061 (Alaska 1980).
195. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 62 (noting that “the Greenway rationale applies, by
definition, only to the first complaint of sexual assault . . . .”); see also Thompson
v. State, 769 P.2d 997 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (the trial court admitted the victim’s
hearsay statements to numerous individuals under Greenway, but the court of
appeals noted that only the initial report should have been admitted under the
rule), Vandiver v. State, 726 P.2d 195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (the trial court
admitted the statement of both a social worker and a police officer under the
Greenway rule; the court of appeals reversed, holding that only the social
worker’s statement could qualify as a first complaint).
196. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 63.
197. Compare Russell v. State, 934 P.2d 1335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (testimony
about the details of the complaint were either admissible or harmless error) with
Thompson, 769 P.2d at 1001 (“Greenway does not allow a detailed description of
the complaining witness’ allegations, the case permits only evidence of the fact
of the complaint and the circumstances under which it was made.”), and Horton
v. State, 758 P.2d 628 (three friends were allowed to testify to the initial
complaint but were not permitted to provide details of the complaint). Greenway
does not allow a detailed description of the complaining witness’ allegations,
but permits only evidence of the fact of the complaint and the circumstances
under which it was made. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1060–61.
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why lower courts have had difficulty applying the exception as it
currently stands.198
The problems associated with each of these current methods for
introducing hearsay statements in the case-in-chief demonstrates the
necessity of a new exception that meets the unique needs of child sexual
abuse prosecutions.

IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE
The first complaint exception to the hearsay rule offers Alaska ruleand policymakers a logical method for balancing the necessity of
hearsay with the rights of defendants.199 A codified exception would
eliminate the current first complaint rule’s uneven application in child
sexual abuse cases, prevent judicial wrangling of the excited utterance
and residual hearsay exceptions, and supplement the current exception
for medical records and recorded statements. The rule can be crafted in
the format of existing Rule 801(d), and read as follows:
Rule 801(d)(4)—Statements That Are Not Hearsay:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if
(4) The statement is a first complaint of sexual abuse offered
by a child under the age of 12 and
(a) The declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross
examination concerning the statement or
(b) The declarant is unavailable as a witness under ARE
804(b)(1–4) and
(1) the statement is made to a family member, friend,
acquaintance, school employee, or medical caretaker not in
the course of a criminal investigation, or

198. Compare D.G. v. State, 754 P.2d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
revealing the identity of the accuser invalidated a first complaint), with
Nusunginya v. State, 730 P.2d 172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (admitting the identity
of the accused in a first complaint),.
199. See Joel Michael Cohen, Nitz v. State: Skewing the Evidentiary Rules to
Prosecute Child Molesters, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 333 (1987). Cohen recognizes the
problems Nitz and its progeny created in the application of the first complaint
rule, and he proposes an exception to the rule against hearsay “that would allow
the out-of-court statement of prompt complaint by a child victim of sexual abuse
under the age of ten to be admitted at trial, so long as the testimony is strictly
limited to the existence of the complaint, and the time and place where it was
made.” Id. at 357.
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(2) the statement is made to a government official where
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
Under this proposed exception, an alleged abuse victim’s first
complaint of sexual abuse would be admissible as substantive evidence
on direct examination. The amendment continues the evolution of the
Greenway first complaint rule by fully removing the freshness
requirement and allowing any initial complaint. Admitting all initial
complaints counteracts the outdated assumption that abuse victims will
immediately cry out, while still allowing the jury to weigh the delay in
determining credibility.200
Furthermore, the rule comports with the reality of sexual abuse
prosecutions by admitting the details of the complaint, including the
identity of the accused. This eliminates any inconsistencies in applying
the details standard and corresponds with the changes that have already
occurred in many jurisdictions.201 Permitting the details of the complaint
also gives the fact-finder a more thorough understanding of the relevant
context and circumstances.202
Subsection (b) of the proposed exception alters the longstanding
first complaint requirement that the victim must testify. Subsection
(b)(1) would allow an unavailable child witness’s statements to be
admitted, provided the statement was made to family members,
acquaintances, or school or medical personnel when no crime is being
investigated. These are the statements most likely given in response to
non-leading questions and are most likely to rely on the speaker’s free
recall. Subsection (b)(2) makes admissible statements made to police
officers or social workers in the course of an investigation, if such
statements helped government officials respond to an ongoing
emergency. The addition of these subsections is important in child
hearsay cases because children are often unavailable to testify due to
young age, memory loss, or stress. It ensures that statements retracted
out of love or fear when the defendant is someone who is close to the
child are still admitted when the evidence is reliable.
The change does not affect the historical purpose of the rule, which
is to corroborate the victim’s claim of sexual abuse. Studies show that
200. Emery v. State, No. A-7799, No. 4608, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 198 (Alaska
Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2002). In Emery, expert testimony: (1) explained that it is
common for a child not to first report in-family sexual abuse to the non-abusing
parent, (2) noted the reasons a child may delay reporting sexual abuse, and (3)
explained why it is common for a child to disclose sexual abuse during a
separate family crisis. Id. at *5.
201. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 63 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
202. Id.
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most children’s accusations of sexual abuse are accurate;203 a victim’s
inability to testify does not necessarily diminish the validity of his or her
claim. Hearsay evidence that would be admitted under this rule
provides corroboration and support for a victim’s statements even in
cases where the victim does not testify.
The altered rule would help alleviate the tendency of some courts
to stretch the excited utterance exception or to over-aggressively use the
residual hearsay exception to admit initial complaints of child sexual
abuse. Under the proposed rule, first complaint evidence can be
admitted substantively, removing the need to use other exceptions when
the victim is unavailable to testify. The rule would not eliminate
admission based on other exceptions. Subsequent complaints could still
be admitted as excited utterances, prior consistent statements, medical
records, or under the residual exception, but they would be required to
legitimately meet the criteria of those exceptions.
While the proposed exception loosens the restrictions on hearsay in
sexual abuse trials, it does so in a manner that is fair to criminal
defendants. The proposed rule allows testimony of the details of the
complaint, but also limits admission to a victim’s first complaint. This
will provide context that may clarify a child’s accusations. More
importantly, the exception provides a definite rule for admissibility,
preventing prosecutors from producing witnesses who repeat similar
statements by the victim that add little substance “but the force of
repetition.”204 For example, in Greenway, the child victim “sounded the
alarm” when she complained of abuse to her mother.205 The statement to
her mother was the first complaint and would have been admissible
under the proposed rule. However, the victim’s later statements to her
guidance counselor would not have been admitted. Such a scenario does
not unduly prejudice the defendant because the adult to whom the child
initially complains will have little reason to ask leading questions or to
interpret the child’s statements as accusations of abuse unless they
clearly are. Testimony from such a conversation will, therefore,
generally be based on the child’s free recall and increase the likelihood
that the accusations are reliable.
The proposed rule also complies with the Confrontation Clause.
Most first complaints by children, even those containing explicit details
and the identity of the accuser, are likely to be nontestimonial in nature
under the criteria set forth in Davis and Crawford. The initial complaint is
the one most necessary to avert the emergency and keep the child from
203. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13.
204. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 61.
205. Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1060 (Alaska 1980).
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danger. A question by a parent, doctor, or other private individual will
almost always precede questioning by a police officer or other agent of
the state.206 From the child’s point of view, the statements are often
spontaneous responses to a question from a parent, more similar to a
“casual remark to an acquaintance” than an accusation.207 The intent or
purpose of the person who receives the statement, especially if the
individual is a family member or friend, also likely indicates that the
statements are nontestimonial.208 Such persons are almost always
motivated by a desire to improve the child’s well-being or to end the
abuse, rather than to investigate a crime. The questioning is also unlikely
to be formalized with a specific intent to elicit accusations. Furthermore,
specifying that nontestimonial statements are admissible allows judges
the discretion to evaluate individual statements under the factors
defined in Davis.

CONCLUSION
Current approaches to admitting children’s statements in sexual
abuse cases are inconsistent, and sometimes run into problems with the
reinvigorated right to confrontation developed by the Supreme Court in
Crawford and Davis. A new, codified exception to the hearsay rules based
on the current first complaint exception will not resolve all of the
difficulties of prosecuting child sexual abuse in Alaska. However, it can
increase the fairness of these prosecutions, and help facilitate
compliance with the Confrontation Clause. Crawford and Davis focused
application of the Confrontation Clause on the prohibition of testimonial
statements. The Court has not yet applied this new paradigm in a child
abuse case. However, the approach has been consistently applied by
lower courts to allow children’s statements to parents, friends, and
medical personnel. Since most first complaints are made to these private
individuals and not to police officers, much evidence admissible under
the first complaint exception will be regarded as nontestimonial and
therefore admissible. The exception proposed here recognizes both the
206. People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21 (Colo. 2006) (admitting statements
made to a child’s father and father’s friend because they were made to private
individuals and were “not solemn or formal statements”); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (noting the framers’ concern for the
“involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye
toward trial . . . .”).
207. In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E. 2d 183, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (finding that the victim’s statements to his mother were
not testimonial because they were similar to a “‘casual remark to an
acquaintance’”).
208. Mosteller, supra note 77, at 947.
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reliability and necessity of child hearsay testimony and the importance
of protecting defendants’ rights to confront their accusers. It represents
an additional tool to help deal with the difficulties of prosecuting child
sexual abuse in Alaska.

